ORANJESTAD, Aruba — The debate over Aruba DOW Reform has reached a point where recognising the problems is no longer enough. The central question now is what Aruba pays every day that decisions, maintenance and administrative reforms are postponed.
The first two parts of this analysis examined the acknowledged problems within the Department of Public Works and argued that structural problems require structural solutions.
The third question is more urgent: what happens if Aruba continues waiting?
Delayed Action Comes With a Growing Cost
Doing nothing is not free.
A road requiring relatively minor maintenance today can eventually deteriorate to the point where reconstruction becomes necessary.
A drainage system that is not maintained can contribute to flooding and damage affecting homes and businesses.
A permit that remains unresolved for months can delay investment, increase financing costs or make a business project impossible to complete.
A government building without preventive maintenance can eventually require a much more expensive intervention.
These examples illustrate the wider argument behind the current criticism of DOW: postponement can transform manageable problems into more expensive ones.
Minister René Herdé previously said Aruba faced an infrastructure-maintenance backlog estimated at approximately Afl. 500 million, including roads, drainage, public buildings and other facilities. Reports based on his presentation also indicated that hundreds of kilometres of roads were considered insufficient or poor.
Aruba Cannot Accept Dysfunction as Normal
Perhaps the greatest danger is not that delays exist, but that residents begin accepting them as normal.
A damaged road should not simply become part of everyday life.
A business should not regard waiting more than a year for an answer as the normal cost of applying for government approval.
Citizens should not expect correspondence to remain unanswered.
Projects should not repeatedly return as announcements without clear information about implementation.
When those situations become routine, frustration gradually becomes resignation.
CUA President Frans Ponson recently argued that some members have waited a year or longer for responses to applications and said businesses need clear decisions and realistic timelines so they can determine whether investments are financially viable.
That concern goes beyond administrative inconvenience.
Infrastructure Is Part of Aruba’s Economy
Aruba’s economy depends heavily on movement and functioning public infrastructure.
Tourists need to travel efficiently.
Employees need to reach their workplaces.
Goods need to move between ports, businesses and consumers.
Investors need permits and government decisions before plans can become operating businesses.
Infrastructure and public administration are therefore not secondary services sitting outside the economy. They are part of the foundation on which economic activity depends.
For that reason, complaints from businesses about DOW should not automatically be dismissed as isolated dissatisfaction.
When delays affect permits, construction, roads and investment, the consequences can extend into the wider economy.
Government Has Already Diagnosed the Problem
The Government of Aruba formally commissioned an organisational scan of DOW in March 2026.
The ministerial decision itself described DOW as an essential organisation responsible for preparing, implementing and maintaining vital infrastructure and acknowledged increasing social pressure, more complex responsibilities and higher expectations involving quality, efficiency and transparency.
That makes the next stage critical.
A scan can identify weaknesses.
A report can recommend reforms.
A minister can acknowledge inherited problems.
But none of those steps alone repairs infrastructure or eliminates an administrative backlog.
The test is implementation.
What Aruba Needs Now
The next phase should be measurable.
Government should establish clear priorities and realistic deadlines for addressing the most urgent DOW problems.
It should identify which projects receive priority, what funding is available, who is responsible for delivery and what progress has actually been made.
The public should also be able to see whether the organisational scan resulted in concrete changes.
That could include published information about pending cases, average processing periods, infrastructure priorities and the status of recommendations already made.
Part 2 of this analysis argued for an administrative emergency plan, service standards, a dedicated approach to the existing backlog and a multi-year infrastructure programme containing costs and deadlines.
Those proposals become increasingly important if delays continue.
Responsibility Must Eventually Produce Results
Herdé has correctly emphasised that responsibility includes acknowledging problems and working toward solutions.
But responsibility must eventually produce visible results.
No reasonable assessment expects one minister to repair every inherited infrastructure problem within a year.
DOW’s challenges developed over a much longer period, and major infrastructure rehabilitation requires financing, personnel, planning and procurement.
The more useful question is whether residents and businesses can see measurable movement in the right direction over the coming months.
Are applications being answered faster?
Is the backlog shrinking?
Are priority roads receiving permanent repairs?
Are maintenance programmes becoming preventive rather than reactive?
Are government projects moving according to publicly understandable schedules?
Those indicators would provide a more meaningful measure of progress than another announcement that the problem has been identified.
Six Months Should Show Direction
Aruba does not need every DOW problem solved within six months.
It does need evidence that the system is changing.
If government publishes priorities, establishes deadlines, assigns responsibility and reports progress, residents can evaluate whether reform is working.
If the same complaints continue while reports, scans and plans accumulate without execution, the issue becomes larger than the performance of one department.
It becomes a question of whether government institutions are capable of converting policy into results.
That is why Aruba DOW Reform should now move from diagnosis toward execution.
The problem has been acknowledged. Businesses have raised the alarm. Government has commissioned studies. Infrastructure needs have been quantified.
The next phase requires deadlines, budgets, accountability and visible progress.
Aruba should not normalise dysfunction. The moment to demonstrate that the system can move in a different direction is now.
